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Footnotes 
1. Press Release, Governor Calls for Complete Review of Public Safety,
Governor Ted Kulongoski, February 26, 2004, accessible at
http://governor.oregon.gov/Gov/press_022604b.shtml.
2. See generally, Michael H. Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy
Sacrifices Public Safety: What’s Wrong and How We Can Fix It, 16
FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 76 (2003).
3. Oregon’s “Measure 11” crimes range from mid-level sexual assault
crimes; second-degree robbery, assault, kidnapping, manslaugh-
ter; and upward.  ORS 137.700 provides mandatory minimum
sentences ranging from 70 to 300 months for these crimes, and
mandates that 15, 16, and 17-year-old offenders charged with
these crimes be tried as adults.  Unlike the “three-strikes” provi-
sions of many states (and Oregon’s “repeat property offender”
provision, ORS 137.717), the mandatory minimum provisions
apply regardless of the offender’s criminal history, though some
discretion to depart is afforded for some of the least serious of
these crimes.  See ORS 137.712.
4. E.g., Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventative Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429
(2001).  Professor Robinson actually argues that by diluting pure
pursuit of just punishment with public safety objectives, we sac-
rifice public safety.  His reasoning reduces to this: citizens despair
that criminals are not suitably punished, lose respect for the crim-
inal justice system, and are therefore less influenced by that sys-
tem in evolving values such as those against drunk driving and
domestic violence.  I submit, however, that it is obvious in the real
world that we do far more harm both to respect and to public
safety by persistently producing recidivism while denying our
responsibility for outcomes.  “Preventive Detention” is a dis-
paraging title opponents of incarceration assign to the incapacita-
tion purpose of sentences.  Their arguments are discussed later in
this paper.
5. ORS 161.025(1)(a) declares the purposes of Criminal Code,
including “To insure the public safety by preventing the commis-
sion of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized, the correction and rehabilitation of those convicted,
and their confinement when required in the interests of public
protection.”  This was based on the 1962 Model Penal Code:
Sentencing §102.2.  Tragically, there is at present a proposal dras-
tically to retreat from the public safety focus of this provision of
the Model Penal Code.  See Michael H. Marcus, Comments on the
Model Penal Code: Sentencing Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 AM. J.
CRIM. LAW 135(2003). 
In February, 2004, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski directeda newly created  “Public Safety Review Steering Committee”to “look at our public safety system from beginning to end”
and to develop “strategies to make the system stronger” wher-
ever it does not sufficiently protect Oregonians.1 In common
with many states, Oregon long ago adopted a modification of
the penal code to declare crime reduction among the purposes
of sentencing.  And in common with many states, Oregon has
adopted a sentencing guidelines model that roughly directs sen-
tencing to reflect crime seriousness, criminal history, and
prison resources—largely or entirely ignoring crime reduction.
Apparently in common with all English-speaking and European
criminal justice systems, Oregon’s criminal justice system thus
exhibits a profound dysfunction: The successful culmination of
most combined law enforcement and prosecution activity is a
conviction followed by a sentence in a criminal case.  Yet, most
sentences imposed on most offenders fail to prevent future criminal
behavior by the sentenced offender; most sentencing does not even
expressly attempt crime reduction.2
The participants in Public Safety Review Steering Committee
represented the typical range of diverse and strongly held views
as to the purposes, failures and successes of criminal justice.
They held opposing positions as to mandatory minimum sen-
tences,3 the viability of general deterrence, and the division of
sentencing responsibilities between the judicial and the legisla-
tive functions (whether the latter is exercised by the people
directly through ballot measures or by the legislature).  My
views on such matters are quite independent of the proposi-
tions asserted in this paper.  The only debate we really need to
resolve before making real progress is already decided by
Oregon law, and by the expectations of most citizens in all
states: crime reduction is a major purpose of sentencing.
Notions to the contrary are dangerously wrong, however moti-
vated.
All rational and informed participants and observers should
agree:
• Whatever the importance of other components of sentenc-
ing, crime reduction is a major purpose.
• Our actual accomplishment of crime reduction falls pro-
foundly short of our proclamations and of our potential.
• To improve our crime reduction impact, we must change the
behaviors of those involved in producing sentencing deci-
sions.
• To succeed, we must pursue strategies to focus criminal jus-
tice participants on responsible, informed, competent, and
effective pursuit of crime reduction through sentencing deci-
sions.
CRIME REDUCTION IS AND MUST BE A MAJOR 
PURPOSE OF SENTENCING
Astonishing as it should seem, there is a body of literature
that argues that sentencing should not be about crime reduc-
tion.4 But Oregon law is unambiguous, and no doubt typical of
most states.  Oregon law has long declared public safety to be
at least among the purposes of sentencing,5 and that policy
choice was more recently enshrined in our state constitution by
vote of the people in Article I, section 15: “Laws for the pun-
ishment of crime shall be founded on these principles: protec-
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6. Constitution of 1859; Amendment promoted by Crime Victims
United, referred by S.J.R. 32, 1995, and adopted by the people
Nov. 5, 1996.
7. Although therapeutic courts also generally avoid using crime
reduction as a measure of success, they are well outside my scope
of concern because they purposefully pursue an objective—usu-
ally alcohol or drug abuse reduction—that in turn strongly corre-
lates with crime reduction.  There are undoubtedly a few offend-
ers whose freedom from addiction actually increases their effi-
ciency in criminal activities, but the net crime reduction impact
of the therapeutic courts is quite probably far superior to the tra-
ditional means of processing the offenders they divert from the
regular criminal dockets.  E.g., Drug Court Resources - Facts &
Figures, National Criminal Justice Reference Service, U.S.
Department of Justice (http://www.ncjrs.org/drug_courts/facts.
html); Looking at a Decade of Drug Courts (Rev. 1999), Drug Court
Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project (DCCTAP),
American University, sponsored by the Drug Courts Program
Office of the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of
Justice (http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/spa/justice/
publications/decade1.htm).  For a collection of more negative
assessments, see Drug Courts and Treatment as an Alternative to
Incarceration (http://www.reconsider.org/issues/drug_court/inter-
esting_facts.htm), RECONSIDER: FORUM ON DRUG POLICY, and
authorities cited.  Even the latter source shows our local drug
court (Multnomah County) as producing rearrest rates roughly
one-third as high as those for graduates of the traditional
approach.  The sentencing support tools discussed in this article
show that our DUI court correlates with greater success for most
cohorts than our conventional correctional devices.
8. See OAR 213-002-0001, particularly:
(3)(d) Subject to the discretion of the sentencing judge to deviate
and impose a different sentence in recognition of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate punishment for
a felony conviction should depend on the seriousness of the
crime of conviction when compared to all other crimes and
the offender’s criminal history. 
(3)(e) Subject to the sentencing judge’s discretion to deviate in
recognition of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
corrections system should seek to respond in a consistent way
to like crimes combined with like criminal histories; and in a
consistent way to like violations of probation and post-prison
supervision conditions.
9. See OAR 213-005-006:
(1) If an offense is classified in grid blocks 8-G, 8-H or 8-I, the
sentencing judge may impose an optional probationary sen-
tence upon making the specific findings on the record:
(a) An appropriate treatment program is likely to be more effec-
tive than the presumptive prison term in reducing the risk of
offender recidivism;
(b) The recommended treatment program is available and the
offender can be admitted to it within a reasonable period of
time; and
(c) The probationary sentence will serve community interests by
promoting offender reformation. 
(2) The sentencing judge shall not impose an optional probation-
ary sentence if:
(a) A firearm was used in the commission of the offense; or
(b) At the time of the offense, the offender was under correctional
supervision status for a felony conviction or a juvenile adju-
dication as defined in OAR 213-003-0001(11); or
(c) The offender’s conviction is for Manufacture of a Controlled
Substance involving substantial quantities of methampheta-
mine, its salts, isomers or salts of its isomers, as defined at
ORS 475.996(1)(a).
(3) A probationary sentence imposed for an offense classified in
grid blocks 8-G, 8-H and 8-I when not authorized by this rule
is a departure.
tion of society, personal responsibility, accountability for one’s
actions and reformation.”6
SENTENCING DOES NOT RESPONSIBLY PURSUE 
CRIME REDUCTION
This is where some colleagues and attorneys begin to
become annoyed with me, but bear with me.  The critical word
is “responsibly.”
First, most sentencing hearings (and probation violation dis-
position hearings) make no mention whatever of crime reduc-
tion.7 The typical dispute, once the legal range of any discre-
tion is settled, is whether a given sentence is “sufficient” to
punish the offender adequately, or somehow “excessive” given
any disadvantages or ameliorating circumstances urged on
behalf of the offender.  Indeed, as to felonies,  Oregon’s sen-
tencing guideline regulations merely mention “security of peo-
ple in person and property,” while stressing “appropriate pun-
ishment,” inviting dispute as to “aggravation” and “mitiga-
tion,”8 and approaching any attempt at meaningful considera-
tion of crime reduction only within the three (of 99) grid blocks
that address “optional probation.”9 No fair reading of the
guidelines or of the regulations can render crime reduction a
significant target of their attention.  To this extent, the rules are
in substantial tension with the statutes and the Oregon
Constitution.
True, we send thieves to theft talk, drunk drivers to alcohol
treatment, bullies to anger counseling, addicts to drug treat-
ment, and sex offenders to sex offender treatment.  But we do
this as a matter of symmetry rather than of science: we do not
select offenders based on their amenability to treatment, but on
the crime they have committed.  We do not select providers on
their impact on criminal behavior, but on their ability to pro-
vide timely paperwork.  We may ask providers if offenders com-
plete “the program” but we do not ask if they reoffend after
treatment. Again, the issue is responsible pursuit of crime reduc-
tion—not nominal pursuit.  It is probably true that many peo-
ple sent to these programs benefit, and that many do not.  What
is certain is that we have made no responsible effort to find out
which programs reduce criminal behavior by which offend-
ers—and, of course, no effort to use the results in making bet-
ter use of these options.
Second, the public and some criminal justice participants
seem to operate on the assumption that incarceration is crime
reduction.  There is a great deal to be said about the relation-
ship between incarceration (incapacitation) and crime reduc-
tion.  When all is said, it is obvious that while locking up some
offenders is indeed the best path to crime reduction, as to oth-
ers there are real issues as to which offenders to treat in the
community, which to relegate to alternative sanctions, and
which to lock up, for how long, and under what conditions.
And it is abundantly clear that we are not smart about those
issues because we make no responsible attempt to tackle them.
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10. See generally, D.A. Andrews, An Overview of Treatment
Effectiveness: Research and Clinical Principles, Department of
Psychology Carleton University, Ottawa Canada (1994);
Treatment Works for Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, National
Mental Health Association, and sources cited
(http://www.nmha.org/children/justjuv/treatment.cfm); Mark
Gornik, Moving from Correctional Program to Correctional Strategy:
Using Proven Practices to Change Criminal Behavior, U.S.
Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, and
sources cited (http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2001/017624.pdf).  P.
Smith, C. Goggin, & P. Gendreau,  The Effects of Prison Sentences
and Intermediate Sanctions on Recidivism: General Effects and
Individual Differences (User Report 2002-01) Ottawa: Solicitor
General Canada, (http://www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/correc-
tions/200201_Gendreau_e.pdf), cited in The Effects of Punishment
on Recidivism, 7 RESEARCH SUMMARY No. 3 (May 2002), Office of
the Solicitor General of Canada, (http://www.sgc.gc.ca/publica-
tions/corrections/pdf/200205_e.pdf).
11. I’ll concede exceptions for the likes of Charlie Manson and orga-
nized crime bosses.
12. There is a third camp worth mentioning here; I’ll call them the
“managers.”  Their concern is short-run efficiency—literally the
speed of the plea bargaining and trial process, and the economy
and budgets of courts, law enforcement, indigent defense, and
corrections.  They see the whole process as one calling for the
control of the use of whatever resources we have, and have
brought us the guidelines which generally seek to regularize the
use of hard beds in proportion to crime seriousness (measured
along an essentially deontological scale of just deserts) and prior
criminal history, with discretion to depart based on aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.  They tout equal treatment and
resource regulation as major accomplishments, although their
success in both respects has its flaws.  But they resist and avoid
statutory and constitutional prescriptions to seek public safety
through crime reduction because, in common with many in both
other camps, they assume that “public safety” is incarceration,
which they try to regulate as a matter of responsible resource
management, and because they are suspicious of the efficacy of
“rehabilitation.”  For the managers, public safety is a function of
how much the public will be willing to spend on hard beds and
some programs, but that is someone else’s problem and responsi-
bility: their’s is to keep the system running efficiently—like pub-
lic transportation officials who have no interest in what com-
muters do when they disembark.  Of course, the managers’ per-
sistent myopia is their failure to appreciate the inefficiency of
incarceration that fails to divert offenders from criminal careers
and simply recycles them into the front end of the criminal jus-
tice system—after one or more new victimizations.
Part of the problem is that of the several camps around the
issue of crime and punishment, a deep divide undermines our
ability to be smart about such issues.  One camp—I’ll use the
label “anti-incarcerationists”—is fairly characterized by a
strong conviction that we are in the midst of an unfortunate
trend towards “mass incarceration,” and that non-punitive
responses are both more humane and more productive of com-
munity safety than punitive sanctions.  This camp cites to a
great volume of literature (produced by the bulk of academia,
which is similarly inclined) suggesting that at least for many
offenders, and at least as measured by recidivism after any jail
or prison term, well designed and delivered treatment programs
are substantially more likely to produce crime reduction than
jail or prison (or poorly designed or delivered treatment, for
that matter).  There is even good evidence from this camp that
punitive sanctions, as well as poorly designed or delivered treat-
ment programs, are often associated with increased recidivism
for at least some offenders.10
The anti-incarceration camp, however, is viewed with under-
standable suspicion by its opposite camp—for which I will use
the label “incarcerationists”—which clings to the conviction
that punishment and incapacitation offer the best road to pub-
lic safety (and to just deserts) for all or virtually all offenders.
The understandable part of this suspicion is that the anti-incar-
cerationists almost entirely avoid confronting the crime reduc-
tion touted by the pro-jail camp: people in custody simply do
not commit crimes on the outside while they are inside.11 This
persistent avoidance of the strongest crime reduction function
of “punishment” gravely undermines the credibility of most
anti-incarcerationists except when they talk to each other.
They are accomplished at doing that; they do a lot of good
work; and they have much to teach us, but they rarely change
or improve anything in criminal justice—they just publish and
attend conferences to talk to teach other.
The anti-incarcerationists, for their part, are deeply suspi-
cious of the incarcerationists—whom they often deem “mass
incarcerationists” or “populist punitivists,” and disparage for
making the United States a leader among nations in incarcera-
tion rates.  The anti-incarcerationists suspect that the real
agenda of their opponents is punishment for its own sake rather
than crime reduction.  On the other hand, some anti-incarcera-
tionists resist careful assessment of the evidence surrounding
the efficacy of incapacitation because they fear, essentially, that
their opponents are correct—that the surest way to prevent
crime on the outside, after all, is to lock up offenders for longer
and longer periods of time.
The following graphic illustrates the divide and how both
sides12 avoid a full picture of public safety:
To make a responsible effort at crime reduction, a sentencing
decision in which jail or prison is available must consider both
how much crime is likely eliminated during incarceration and
how post-incarceration criminal behavior is likely to be
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13. The notable exceptions are impaired drivers and “johns” arrested
for prostitution—having mistaken an undercover “prostitution
decoy” for the real thing.  There are recidivists among these
offenders, of course, but they are relatively rare—a good thing,
since they are also often quite dangerous.
14. We can choose to exclude drug crime as “victimless,” or recognize
that users victimize themselves, family, or friends who care about
or are dependent upon them, the communities that suffer from
the public manifestations of abuse, or those from whom they may
steal to support their addictions.  Dealers may do all of this, and
also victimize those whose substance abuse they support.
Recognizing this extent of victimization, however, does not
resolve whether deployment of the criminal justice system is the
best way to combat substance abuse.
15. Portland Police Bureau Data Processing, August 25, 2000.  The
Portland Bureau of Police stopped producing these statistics in
mid-2000; I am still awaiting their successor.  An extract of the
statistics is available at http://www.smartsentencing.com.
16. The Booking Frequency Pilot Project in Multnomah County, Oregon:
A Focus on Process and Frequencies, at i (The Multnomah County
Sheriff’s Office, Dan Noelle, Sheriff, in collaboration with the
Multnomah County Department of Community and Family
Services, Department of Community Justice, Health Department,
and Corrections Health Division (January 2002)).  Portland is the
largest city in Multnomah County, Oregon. “DSS-Justice” is a
data-warehouse-based criminal justice tool, which also supports





17. Bureau of Justice Statistics Criminal Offenders Statistics, found at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm.
18. Bureau of Justice Statistics Criminal Offenders Statistics, found at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/rpr94.htm.
19. One measure is Multnomah County Court data showing new
felony case filings in 2003 at 6,114, and new misdemeanor case
filings at 23,737.
affected.  Both camps are right, after all: longer jail sentences
and prison do increase post-prison criminal behavior among
some offenders; incarceration does reliably prevent criminal
behavior (at least on the outside) during the period of cus-
tody—and, for some, after release.  We cannot make these deci-
sions responsibly by relying on the ideology, philosophy, or
what poses as the entrenched wisdom of judges—unless of
course our resulting enormous recidivism rates really are the
best we can expect to achieve.
SENTENCING CURRENTLY DOES NOT ADEQUATELY
ACCOMPLISH CRIME REDUCTION
It didn’t take long for me to realize after taking the bench in
1990 that the first offender is a rare occurrence in our system.13
It became immediately obvious that most of those we sentence
have been sentenced before, and that most would probably
offend and be sentenced again—often having produced another
victimization.14 The notion that we were actually managing
criminal careers occurred to me early in my own career as a
judge.  That notion was soon followed by the suspicion and
then the conviction that we could surely do a better job of
diverting offenders from criminal careers if we made some sub-
stantial effort to do so—by employing data, evidence, and any-
thing better than our various philosophies, assumptions, and
untested beliefs about how people work.
Most tragic are the serious crimes.  Typically, a victim has
been grievously hurt, and the offender has been sentenced
repeatedly before committing this latest crime, often beginning
a criminal career as a juvenile.  If only we had done something
effective before, we might have prevented both the victimiza-
tion and the years of incarceration.  Though there are surely
many crimes we could not have prevented, it is also certain that
we have not exercised our best efforts to prevent those that we
could have prevented—and highly likely that we would have
diverted many offenders from criminal careers, and prevented
many crimes, had we just made a responsible effort to do so.
In any event, there is no question but that recidivism rates
are abysmal. There are many measures, but they surely repre-
sent the impact of sentencing that is not responsibly aimed at
crime reduction.  Of the 2,395 people jailed in Portland,
Oregon, during July 2000,15 1,246 had been jailed in Portland
on some other occasion within the previous 12 months.  The
same was true as to 22 of the 32 jailed that month for burglary,
22 of the 23 jailed for robbery, 20 of the 26 jailed for first-degree
theft, 304 of the 372 jailed on drug charges, and 32 of the 39
jailed for vehicle theft.  And  “4% of our offenders accounted for
23% of [s]tandard  bookings between 1995 and 1999.”16
Nationally, the figures are similar:  the Bureau of Justice
Statistics reflects that “[m]ore than 7 of every 10 jail inmates
had prior sentences to probation or incarceration,” and that
“[o]f the 108,580 persons released from prisons in 11 States in
1983, an estimated 62.5% were rearrested for a felony or seri-
ous  misdemeanor within 3 years, 46.8% were reconvicted, and
41.4% returned to prison or jail.”17 “Sixty-seven percent of for-
mer inmates released from state prisons in 1994 committed at
least one serious new crime within the following three years,”
and “272,111 offenders discharged in 1994 had accumulated
4.1 million arrest charges before their most recent imprison-
ment and another 744,000 charges within 3 years of release.”18
Oregon’s Department of Corrections publishes a recidivism
rate of 30%, and a target of 28%, but these figures are pro-
foundly misleading as they only reflect convictions for a new
felony.  This approach is typical of many state corrections
departments.  Almost 80% of criminal incidents involve misde-
meanors, including most thefts, drunk driving, most assaults,
and most crimes that affect public safety, so total recidivism
after prison is quite probably at least as high in Oregon as the
other statistics would suggest.19
The amount of custody available as a sentence varies as a
matter of law and as a matter of prison and jail resources.  As a
matter of law, Oregon misdemeanors—again, almost 80% of the
crimes committed in our communities—cannot result in more
than one year in jail.  As a matter of resource limitation, jails
often release offenders well before their terms are complete sim-
ply because there are an insufficient number of beds.  As a prac-
tical reality, the crime-prevention impact of custody through
incapacitation may be extremely short in duration, and the pos-
sibility of any crime-increasing impact outweighing a short
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20. Our sentencing support data, discussed later in the text, confirms
the impression of the literature that for low level offenders, short
jail terms (one to five days) generally “work” better than longer
ones (30 days or more) because the shorter terms are less disrup-
tive of circumstances supportive of lawful behavior: employment,
housing, and stable relationships.  Higher up the range of incar-
ceration, longer terms encourage accommodating life in custody
and associating with a prison population, and are thought to
enhance criminal thinking and values.  See, e.g., Smith, Goggin,
& Gendreau, supra note 10.  Of course, for some offenders, good
programming within prison can produce significant reduction in
post-prison criminal behavior.  In my view, our persistence in
conducting the sentencing ritual as if crime reduction were not its
purpose ultimately undermines the ability of correctional author-
ities to provide programs in and out of custody that would serve
public safety if applied to the right offenders.
21. Oregon has adopted “repeat property offender” legislation to pro-
vide presumptive sentences of 13 or 19 months for persistent
property offenders.  ORS 137.717.
22. Oregon’s guidelines are accessible at http://www.ocjc.state.or.us/
SGGrid.htm and the administrative rules are accessible at
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_200/OAR_213/213_tofc.
html.
23. Even if proponents of prison can be confident in holding the line
against any reduction in the number of prison beds, economics
can limit the growth in that number over time.  Moreover, hard
beds certainly compete with program expenditures for corrections
dollars—and program expenditures, at least for some serious
criminals, greatly affect the likelihood that they will reoffend
when returned to their communities.  Again, the trick is to aim
the programs at the offenders who will benefit from them, and not
to fill slots with those who will not.
24. See 1997 Or Laws Ch 433.
25. The Oregon State Police began work on a public safety data ware-
house that would have eventually supported such an effort, but
returned the balance of a federal grant and cancelled the project
rather than come up with matching money in the early days of
Oregon’s current budget crisis. 
26. A data warehouse automatically collects copies of data stored in
multiple systems, and stores the resulting information in a form
and structure designed to facilitate analysis that would otherwise
require separate access to each of those systems and manual com-
pilation of reports.  Multnomah County’s “DSS-Justice” data ware-
house, constructed and maintained under the auspices of the
Multnomah County Local Public Safety Coordinating Council, is
refreshed nightly from the source systems, and supports a host of
applications for criminal justice partners. See http://www.
lpscc.org/docs/overview_dss-j.pdf.
period of protection is very, very real.20 As to this group, any
unbiased and reasonable examination of the data about the out-
comes of past sentences—particularly in connection with the
abundant literature—must conclude that some offenders are
more likely to be diverted from future crime with one approach
at supervision, programs, jail, and other sanctions, while others
are more likely to be diverted from criminal behavior by another
approach.  Consistently with most other human experience, dif-
ferent things play out differently with different people.
Even with felony crimes, we are again confronted with the
reality that the far more common crimes are the least serious,
for which neither the law nor corrections resources afford a
great deal of potential for incarceration.  Under our sentencing
guidelines (which apply only to felonies), the more common,
lower-level felonies (predominately including drug possession,
property crimes valued at less than $5,000, except those of
“repeat property offenders,”21 and auto theft where the vehicle
is worth less than $10,000) are subject to a presumptive proba-
tionary sentence with jail not to exceed 30, 60, or 90 days.22
Prison becomes a presumptive sentence only at crime serious-
ness level 4 out of 11 levels (predominately including property
crimes valued at $5,000 or above, auto theft involving personal
use vehicles worth $10,000 or more, and the lowest level of
drug-delivery crimes), and then only for offenders with at least
two prior person felonies (or “repeat property offenders”).  It is
only at crime seriousness level 5 (including property crimes
valued at $10,000) that prison becomes presumptive for most
felony offenders, and at 8 (including the most serious drug-
dealing crimes, mid-level sex crimes, burglary of an occupied
dwelling) for all.  And the range of presumptive prison begins
at six months and doesn’t exceed three years until we reach
level 8, and then only for offenders with at least two prior per-
son felonies.  Even by departure, many of the lower-level
offenses are capped at 6, 12, or 18 months.  So for most felony
sentencing occasions, the opportunity to do more harm than
good is entirely consistent with the recidivism data.
Even at the higher levels of felony crime, we often have sub-
stantial discretion to depart upward beyond mandatory mini-
mum sentences, or to choose between consecutive and concur-
rent sentences.  Our choices in this regard undoubtedly have a
public safety impact—as with all of our sentencing choices.  We
would probably do a better job of exercising that discretion if
we made some responsible effort to analyze the likelihood that
offender characteristics, available programs in prison, or other
variables would make one offender more likely than another to
need extended incapacitation, or more likely to be safe to return
to society after serving concurrent time.  At the very least, our
decision affects the availability of beds for those that should be
locked up longer to protect society.23
MULTNOMAH COUNTY’S APPROACH—SENTENCING
SUPPORT TOOLS AND A REVISED ORDER FOR
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
Although state law has since 1997 provided for the collec-
tion and management of criminal justice data to facilitate dis-
covery of correlations between what we do to various offenders
and their recidivism rates,24 there is currently no effort at the
state level to implement this function.25 Multnomah County,
with the assistance of a public safety technology bond issue, has
constructed a data warehouse26 and related criminal justice
applications that provide this function to practitioners.
A user of this DSS-Justice sentencing support application
(one of many criminal justice applications based on the ware-
house) enters a case number and selects the charge for which a
sentence is being imposed.  The program constructs a bar chart
based on data for the offender and the charge selected.  The
chart includes a bar for sentencing elements imposed on such
offenders for such a charge, arrayed left to right in order of their
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27. Bars display only for those sentencing elements that have been
imposed at least thirty times for the cohort in question, but a table
below the bar chart displays all data for all elements imposed for
the cohort.   The thirty-occasion minimum discourages predic-
tions based on insufficient data.
28. Data rules determine whether a given criminal history receives a
rating of  “none,” “low,” “moderate,” “major,” or “severe.”  In all
but domestic violence, only convictions count; arrests not fol-
lowed by dismissal for want of merit (as opposed to mere loss of
victim cooperation, for example) do elevate a domestic violence
rating.  The rules are accessible at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mul/
marcus_crimethemegrid.pdf.
29. A step-by-step description, with screen shots, and a link to a user
manual are available at http://www.smartsentencing.com.
declining frequency.27 Each bar reflects the proportion of those
receiving that sanction who were free of any new conviction for
a similar crime within three years.  Note that this approach dis-
plays incarcerative and non-incarcerative sanctions side by side,
measured by precisely the same test. 
The right side of the screen displays the variables upon
which the bar chart is based.  By default, the user’s choice of
crime for sentencing yields a variable that chooses one of six
categories of crime as a “similar crime.”  For example, choosing
first-degree theft yields a default of “property crime,” so that the
program is analyzing sentences imposed on similar offenders
for any property crime.  By default, a “similar offender” is one
who has a similar criminal record and similar demographics
(age, gender, and ethnicity).  A “similar” criminal record is one
that reflects the same rating, from “none” to “severe,” in each of
six crime categories: violent crime, sex crime, property crime,
drug crime, major traffic crime (including impaired driving),
and domestic violence.28
Users can modify all of the variables and generate a new bar
chart in seconds.  For example, if we are dealing with a com-
mon cohort, we may be able to focus on only those offenders
sentenced for the same crime as the offender before the court,
so the program allows a user to change “property crime” to
“Theft I.”  If the offender’s cohort is less common, we may have
to expand it to compare offend-
ers, like the one before the court,
who have been sentenced for
any crime.  We may want to
focus on those sentenced for
felonies or only Class A felonies
to distinguish among levels of
drug involvement.  We may also
want to modify what we mean
by “similar” offender.  For exam-
ple, the prosecutor may provide
evidence of a criminal record
from outside the data known to
the tools.  A user can access
“profile” to revise the criminal
history ratings in each of the
crime categories.  In a similar
fashion, the user can correct age
or even gender errors, or
broaden or eliminate the “pro-
file” categories to analyze a
broader cohort.
Finally, users can modify the
outcome measure.  The default
measure of recidivism is a new
conviction for a similar crime
within three years.  Users can specify instead conviction for a
specific crime, for “any crime,” or for a crime in any of the six
crime categories.  Users can also modify the period during
which recidivism is tallied (six months, three years, five years,
or any time since sentencing), and can choose to focus on
arrests instead of convictions (particularly useful in domestic
violence cases).29
The point of all of this is not to rely upon technology to
select a sentence, but to focus the attention of the sentencing
process on public safety through crime reduction.  Of course,
the tools cannot tell us with whether the results were caused by
the disposition, or if variables unknown to the program account
for disparate results.  But they give us a good look at our past
results, and provide far more information than ever before
available.  More importantly, they focus the attention of the par-
ticipants on crime reduction.  Just as sentencing guideline
grids, carried dutifully by practitioners into every courtroom,
ensure the presence of the ephemeral calculus of guideline sen-
tencing, sentencing support tools can encourage all to remem-
ber that we are supposed to be seeking crime reduction.  With
that focus, advocates and probation officers can supplement the
data available from sentencing support tools with information
about the offender’s particular circumstances or treatment his-
tory, the availability or not of local community-based or custo-
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Screen Shot of a Sentencing Support Display
30. The law surely does not forbid consideration of public safety
implications when a judge exercises discretion in any of these
areas, but participants rarely address those implications.  The
hope is that when public safety impact is an expressly articulated
consideration, it will receive more frequent attention than when
its role is merely permissive and implicit.
31. The proposal would not affect the automatic remand of juveniles
whose crimes and ages fit within mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions introduced by “Ballot Measure 11,” ORS 137.700.
32. One withdrawn proposal is for resurrection of the Public Safety
Data Warehouse and replication statewide of the Multnomah
County sentencing support application.  It was clear that this
failed the “reasonably available economic resource” test in this
budgetary climate. 
33. There are endless possibilities, ranging from the modest to the
comprehensive.  In one real sense, making crime reduction
impact an express consideration for departures would itself add a
public safety dimension to the guidelines.  The availability of a
program in the community (or in custody, for that matter) that is
more likely than other sanctions to reduce recidivism could be a
consideration for all sentences that approach the divide between
presumptive prison and presumptive probation—or indeed, for
all sentences.  And it might make sense to use a risk prediction
instrument to posit a presumptive period of incarceration for all
crimes for which incarceration is plausible; it makes no sense to
ignore psychopathy around violent crime in particular.
Ideally, within the limits of proportionality, risk prediction and
assessment, criminogenic factor analysis, and resources would
drive the articulation of a presumptive sentence for all crimes and
criminal histories, with departures based on compelling and sub-
stantial reasons to forfeit crime reduction for some other purpose
becoming the exception. But a journey of ten thousand miles
begins with a single step.
34. “Project Bond” is an undertaking promoted by Circuit Judge
Pamela Abernethy of Marion County.  Based on literature docu-
menting the crime-reduction efficacy of such intervention in the
target “at risk” families, this effort involves adult offenders, whose
household includes very young children, in parenting education
and appropriate social services.
35. Space does not allow a full consideration of all of these, but most
are considered at length on the “Frequently Asked Questions”
page of my website at http://www.smartsentencing.com.
dial programs, or with research germane to a particular sen-
tencing analysis.
As part of the same effort, we have begun building a new
partnership between the courts and probation officers, encour-
aging officers to discuss their assessments and expertise around
the literature of criminology and corrections with courts on the
occasion of probation violation allegations.  We have added a
box to the standard order for a presentence investigation,
requesting that the report include “analysis of what is most
likely to reduce this offender’s future criminal behavior and
why, including the availability of any relevant programs in or
out of custody.”  Pre-sentence investigation writers now regu-
larly include an analysis of what is most likely to work, citing
literature and sentencing support results to the court.
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT
I have made some additional proposals to the Adult
Sentencing Subcommittee and to the Public Safety Review
Steering Committee, generally intended not as changes to sub-
stantive law but as strategies for increasing the focus of advo-
cates and decision makers on the issue of crime reduction.
Specifically, I proposed that data and research concerning crime
reduction be expressly30 recognized as a consideration in depar-
tures under the guidelines, decisions whether to impose con-
secutive or concurrent sentences, whether to “remand” a juve-
nile to adult court,31 and whether to continue, modify, or
revoke a juvenile or adult probation.  Because of suspicion of
“research” and researchers in some quarters, these proposals
remain on the table so far only because references to “data and
research” have been replaced with references to “reduction in
criminal conduct and crime rates.”
Another proposal still on the table32 is that the legislature
direct the Criminal Justice Commission to explore the feasibil-
ity of incorporating crime reduction into the contours of the
sentencing guidelines—which presently are organized around
just deserts, criminal history, and prison resources to the virtual
exclusion of crime reduction.  It has been my position since the
guidelines were first under discussion that a sentence most
likely to result in crime reduction ought to be the presumptive
sentence absent a substantial and compelling reason to seek
some other purpose—but merely adding crime reduction to the
mix that determines what is a “presumptive” sentence would be
a profound improvement.33
Other proposals may find their way to other subcommittees
of the Public Safety Review Steering Committee: that the
Department of Corrections be directed to include misde-
meanors in their published recidivism rates; that the statute
governing presentence investigations be amended along the
lines of Multnomah County’s modification to the form for
ordering such investigations; that other counties somehow be
encouraged to emulate Marion County’s “Project Bond;”34 that
probation officers’ roles be modified along the lines encouraged
in Multnomah County.
But my overall hope is that this work actually produce some-
thing of real magnitude.  If all we accomplish is some minor
adjustment to a system that produces the recidivism I have
described, we will not begin to reach our true goals.  We may
make some real progress by pursuing the sort of strategies I
have suggested.
OBJECTIONS TO AND CONCERNS ABOUT THIS
APPROACH
Subcommittee participants and others have raised a variety
of objections and concerns about injecting crime reduction
analysis into sentencing, plea bargaining, probation, or other
criminal justice functions.35 A discussion of a few follows.  Of
course, Oregon law requires that we consider public safety in
sentencing.  Whether or not we do so, however, our choices
have outcomes in the sense that some choices will not prevent
future victimizations while others may; our present perfor-
mance is abysmal when measured by public safety.  Trying
harder to achieve best efforts should help.  Avoiding those
efforts certainly will not.
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36. Or. Const, Art. I, § 15.
37. Specific deterrence is the effect on the offender who is punished,
with the assumption that an offender will avoid behavior in the
future that resulted in punishment in the past.  General deter-
rence is the effect on potential offenders in general—the prospect
of being punished makes some of these decide not to commit
crimes they otherwise would commit.  I suspect that the efficacy
of specific deterrence is minimal to none for most offender
cohorts, as poignantly demonstrated by persistently punished
offenders.  The literature around specific deterrence suggests that
for some cohorts, punishment increases recidivism—at least as
measured after incapacitation, but it clearly appears to work on
others.  Literature suggests (albeit essentially on an a priori basis,
hypothesized with the use of economic models) that any efficacy
of general deterrence depends on the certainty and swiftness of a
sanction—not its severity. 
38. ORS 161.025(1)(a) provides that criminal sentences seek “[t]o
insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses
through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the
correction and rehabilitation of those convicted, and their con-
finement when required in the interests of public protection.”
Concerns about the impact on the length of custodial 
sentences or the severity of sentences
As might be expected, one camp fears that adding any sub-
ject to sentencing analysis just provides another opportunity to
find some excuse for a lighter sentence, while the other camp
fears that pursuit of crime reduction will result in longer sen-
tences.  The combination is a de facto collusion in favor of the
pursuit of other objectives, or a pursuit of crime reduction
devoid of information.  Whatever might be said of a system
with unlimited jail terms and beds, for the vast majority of our
sentences, law and resources make sentences long enough in
their own right to achieve sustained crime reduction simply
unavailable.  Smarter sentencing for most occasions means
using scarce resources more intelligently—using longer terms
on those whose criminal behavior is best reduced with longer
terms, and shorter terms with effective programs and treat-
ments for those whose crime reduction is best achieved by that
approach.  Smarter sentencing does not inherently increase or
decrease the total amount of jail and prison time served by
offenders—its function is to make the allocation of that jail and
prison time more efficiently productive of crime reduction
through more intelligent decisions about which offenders to
imprison for longer terms and which for shorter.
As to longer terms and more serious crimes, the stakes
increase but the principles do not vary.  Whether to run sen-
tences consecutively or concurrently has a real public safety
impact as to an offender’s likelihood of reoffense.  This decision
also has a real impact on the distribution of prison resources—
hard and soft—which in turn impact our success at crime
reduction for other offenders.  Making these decisions without
attention to and information concerning crime reduction can
only undermine their accuracy.
To those who favor prison I suggest that we have to face the
reality that we cannot use it forever on everyone, that we must
responsibly allocate what resources we have to achieve the
greatest public safety, and that we must use intelligence and
scarce resources—including alternatives, treatment, and pro-
grams as well as incarceration—to achieve our best efforts at
diverting an offender from crime before the next victimization.
If prison is always best, carefully examining the data should
generate more support for hard beds.
To those who disfavor prison, I suggest that the limitation of
jail and prison time at the lower levels provides the best oppor-
tunity to establish and exploit the efficacy of responsible treat-
ment, that demonstrating within the criminal justice process the
crime reduction impact of these approaches can only build sup-
port for improved and expanded treatment and alternative
resources.  The public cannot be expected to relax the security
it believes that it has gained from mandatory imprisonment
until and unless it has been convinced that public safety is reli-
ably achieved for some through other approaches.
Indeed, both camps are right about different offenders.  The
real question is which ones—and we cannot expect to answer
that question without information.
Concerns about the impact on the “other purposes” of 
sentencing
Although we now may speak of “protection of society, per-
sonal responsibility, accountability for one’s actions and refor-
mation,”36 these overlapping objectives capture but do not dis-
place the traditional purposes of retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrence (general and specific),37 and incapacitation.  Oregon
law already identifies most of these as tools of crime reduction.38
Although retribution per se has no purported role in crime
reduction (outside the scope of the death penalty), the remain-
ing functions are clearly not “displaced” just because we con-
sider public safety.  And to whatever extent general deterrence
actually works to control crime, retribution obviously overlaps
that function, as does any substantial sanction.  My experience
is that the overwhelming majority of cases evidence no tension
whatever when we consider first our best public safety result,
and next the remaining concerns.  That which is best for pub-
lic safety usually satisfies any need for denunciation, victim sat-
isfaction, rehabilitation, or confinement.  It is also my experi-
ence that many victims who exercise their right to be heard at
sentencing spontaneously articulate the objective of preventing
others from suffering a loss, injury, or other victimization at the
hands of the offender.  
There are some significant exceptions of course.  Classic are
the social drinker who kills a stranger while driving and in fact
swears off alcohol for life as a result, or the truly opportunistic,
intra-familial sex offender who will indeed benefit from treat-
ment and avoid recidivism under supervision.  Social and vic-
tim needs may well eclipse any sentence based on crime reduc-
tion alone in these and other cases.  But my proposals do not
urge or require that we abandon the “other purposes” of sen-
tencing when they in fact conflict with best crime reduction
practices.  In the vast majority of cases there is no conflict.  In
those in which crime reduction conflicts with some other pur-
pose, our task is to make the best choice—which may require
displacing crime reduction as the primary objective of a sen-
tence.  That is no excuse, of course, for abandoning crime
reduction as our lodestar in all other cases.
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Concerns about the competence of the participants and the
reliability of risk prediction
Opponents of risk prediction by judges or with sociological
instruments deem incapacitation in the interests of crime reduc-
tion “preventive detention” to disparage it, and point to litera-
ture stressing the “false positives” of incarcerating those who in
fact would not reoffend if unconfined.  Proponents of incapaci-
tation for public safety insist that incarceration is the most reli-
able means of crime reduction while an offender is locked up,
and fear that releases based on risk prediction will (as they have)
produce “false negatives” in the form of victimizations, includ-
ing rape and murder.  Academics fear that judges and lawyers are
not up to the task of handling this level of information.  
Again, if the measure of success is crime reduction, we are
doing a terrible job in light of our recidivism data.  Determining
the length of jail or prison terms by some measure other than
crime reduction cannot improve its success at crime reduction.
In other words, we surely have more “false positives” in terms
of locking up those whose incarceration is not necessary for
crime reduction if we do not even consider crime reduction in
the mix—at least in the context of the nation with the highest
rate of incarceration in the Western world.  Those who fear
“false positives” would change the definition of error, not
improve our ability to avoid it.  They also miss this important
point:  an offender who has committed a serious crime and rep-
resents a substantial risk of reoffending may and should be con-
sidered for longer incapacitation even if we cannot be certain he
will reoffend.
As to false negatives, they, too, must be higher if we ignore
information than if we make an attempt to use it wisely.  After
all, we almost always impose less than the maximum sentence,
jail authorities are often forced to release many before the
imposed sentence is served, and most offenders are released
before trial.  Indeed, jails already use risk-prediction instruments
and matrices for these decisions, and are probably doing a much
better job of keeping the worst offenders in custody than we
would left to our own devices.  Sentencing with knowledge of
the matrix release realities, and with information upon which to
exercise our own best efforts is more likely to reduce false nega-
tives than rejecting the role of risk assessment and continuing
the status quo, resulting in shorter than maximum terms, matrix
releases free of the crucible of the adversarial process in court,
and pretrial release compelled by limited jail space.
Academics worry that lawyers and judges are not up to this
kind of work.  Put aside that judges often resolve battles of
experts—who often cite research—in litigation involving mal-
practice, product liability, and intellectual property rights.  The
fact is that most judges already try to choose sentences that may
reduce crime, and many lawyers join in with snippets of wis-
dom or folklore about what works or not: “Do not lock up my
client so long that he will lose his job; we all know that unem-
ployment is criminogenic.”  We are making decisions daily with
this level of discussion and thought.  Surely our results would
be improved with increased attention to the data and to the lit-
erature, and increased application of competent advocacy to the
examination of any such proposition and its application to a
given offender.
If we disqualify participants from this subject, we certainly
cannot expect best efforts or best results from the process.
Concerns about the reliability of research and data
The most extreme resistance to research takes the form of
rejection of virtually all research as imperfect because it fails to
follow the ideal research design of random assignment control
group analysis.  Even assuming it were somehow feasible to sub-
ject every sentencing option available in every jurisdiction to
such a study, refusing to allow any increased attention to public
safety or involvement of data and research in sentencing deci-
sions until those studies were complete is itself wholly irrational.
We are not assessing sentencing as a possible activity pending
due diligence as to whether it should be done at all—sentencing
is under way, daily, with demonstrably dangerous results.  Those
who insist on ideal research before using any research or making
a better attempt at crime reduction hold their own views to no
such standard (citing, for example, correlations between prison
bed numbers and crime rates as proof of the efficacy of jail and
prison).  They surely offer no research—ideal or otherwise—to
argue that continuing on our present course is more productive
of public safety than making our best efforts with imperfect
information.  Moreover, what matters is what works on which
offenders, and the best of studies will always leave unanswered
the question why even a sanction that works so does on some
but not all members of the group that proves “success.”  True,
we need to be critical and to recognize the limitations of pre-
dictability, the flaws in research, and the great deal we do not
know.  Demanding that the adversarial process employ informa-
tion and address the goal of crime reduction is surely more likely
to do a better job of reducing recidivism than awaiting perfect
research while making no informed or serious attempt mean-
while to achieve smarter sentencing.
Concerns about the energy and time smart sentencing 
would demand
Judges, prosecutors, and administrators are concerned with
how long hearings take, and are concerned that any change will
increase the inefficiency of the process—on a case-per-unit-time
basis.  They fear that any attention to crime reduction will nec-
essarily result in protracted hearings with experts, additional
indigent expense funds to pay for them, and clogged dockets.  It
seems to be in the nature of social activities that they take on a
life and meaning of their own, and that as participants we find
ourselves blithely accepting the needs of the system rather than
focusing on its public purposes.  Managers of public transporta-
tion want the trains to run on time, but pay little or no heed to
what the passengers do when they get where they are going.
Likewise a criminal justice system that looks from the inside as
if the highest objective is to resolve as many cases as quickly as
possible, with plea bargains, jury waivers, truncated evidence—
whatever it takes.  Presiding judges and court administrators,
supervising defense and prosecution attorneys, do not ask us
how just a result we have facilitated, and they certainly do not
ask how effectively we have reduced criminal behavior.
All that being said, there is nothing about considering crime
reduction that takes it outside the normal systemic factors that
determine how much energy a topic actually receives from the
process.  At the high-volume end of the system, where cases are
negotiated in minutes, we can only expect fleeting references to
the notions of criminogenic factors and incapacitation.
Practitioners can gradually become more fluent in what we
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know about which offenders, just as they do now on topics
such as the latest alternative sanctions, jail practices, suppres-
sion case law, or changes in local court procedures.  As they do
so, they can replace some verbal content of typical plea negoti-
ations with growing attention to routine factors affecting best
crime reduction practices in a given set of circumstances—and
they can do so without losing anything of value in the discus-
sion, without adding to the duration of the exchange, and with
some increased hope of improving the likelihood that a result-
ing sentence will actually prevent future crime.
At the other end of the spectrum, we already have hearings
with experts and what amounts to risk assessment in death
penalty and dangerous offender proceedings.  There is room for
varying levels of intensity in the consideration of relevant sen-
tencing data and research along the entire spectrum of criminal
practice; there is no level at which its increased presence would
be unlikely to improve our public safety performance.  Yes, we
could afford to spend a bit more time and energy seeking smart
sentencing across that range.  But even if reducing the human
cost of victimizations is not enough to convince the managers,
this should be:  The biggest inefficiency of time and resource is
the persistent offender; to the extent that smart sentencing
offers an opportunity to divert offenders from criminal careers,
even managers should at least take heed that speed is not our
most important product.
CONCLUSION
Oregon’s governor gave his steering committee an ambitious
charge—to ask “whether the system we have in place suffi-
ciently protects Oregonians” and, if not “to look for short and
long-term strategies to make the system stronger.”  The recidi-
vism we produce by doing things the way we have been doing
them answers the first question unambiguously.  The strategies
proposed here would make the system stronger by encouraging
practitioners to bring crime reduction into actual focus in crim-
inal sentencing proceedings.  
Others may have better or additional strategies.  But merely
looking for places to tweak the skirmish lines among those who
favor custody, those who fear mass incarceration, and those
who mostly manage can never yield the substantially better
results the public needs and deserves.  Our public safety prob-
lem surely includes persistent offenders and pervasive recidi-
vism.  Can smarter sentencing not be among the responses?
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